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A dynamic version of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is developed in the present paper. 
Our  model  introduces  investment  in  traditional  DEA  and  imposes  intertemporal  cost 
minimization.  Adding  an  intertemporal  adjustment  constraint  into  the  cost  minimization 
problem, we derive the relation between the DEA variables of the cost function and those of 
the primary production frontiers’ coefficients. The augmented DEA model can be solved using 
standard linear programming. This dynamic framework enables computing the production 
frontiers, measuring the productive efficiencies and evaluating the potential economies all in 
the presence of adjustment costs.  
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The data envelopment analysis (DEA), pioneered by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), is an 
alternative to the traditional parametric approach of quantitative analysis.  It offers a robust tool in 
studying of production frontiers and evaluating the performance of decision-making units (DMU). 
DEA is an optimization method based on mathematical programming generalizing the Farrell (1957) 
single-input/single-output technical efficiency measure to the multiple-input/multiple-output case by 
constructing a relative efficiency score as the ratio of a single virtual output to a single virtual input. 
DEA has rapidly extended to returns to scale, dummy or categorical variables, discretionary 
and non-discretionary variables, incorporating value judgments, longitudinal analysis, weight 
restrictions, stochastic DEA, non-parametric Malmquist indexes, technical change in DEA and 
many  other  features.    But  until  now,  most  existing  DEA  models  rarely  take  into  account 
intertemporal adjustment costs.  Consequently, the estimated frontiers may be biased, even 
strongly biased in presence of high adjustment costs.  To correctly calculate the production 
frontier, the adjustment restrictions and costs from period to period must be taken into account. 
Nemoto and Goto (2003) proposed a DEA model with adjustment costs incorporated.  The 
authors implicitly impose the following assumption on the adjustment: when investments occur, 
the fictive “best” DMU’s adjustment cost is often strictly higher than that of the considered 
DMU. Because of this, the efficiency of the considered DMU could be overestimated. When 
disinvestments occur, the fictive dominant DMU has an adjustment cost lower than that of the 
considered DMU, which is insufficient to be best DMU and the efficiency score so obtained 
could be anything. Briefly, biased results could rise from the authors’ irrelevant assumption. 
The present paper focuses on introducing a new version of dynamic DEA model with weaker 2 
 
and more realistic assumptions.  
First, we define a temporary production function. By temporary, we mean the production 
frontier existing at a given time. The term frontier refers to an optimal capacity of transformation 
of the inputs into outputs. Several definitions are possible. We can define the frontier by the 
maximal quantity that a production unit can produce from the given quantities of inputs. We can 
also define the same frontier by the minimal quantity of inputs necessary to produce a given 
vector of outputs.  There are still other alternatives.  For example, we may be satisfied to 
optimize on a subset of inputs.  Banker and Morey (1986) used this strategy in their efficiency 
analysis for exogenously fixed inputs and outputs.  When completely or partially fixed or out of 
the manager’s control, an input is said to be quasi-fixed or nondiscretionary.   
The quasi-fixed inputs, such as the size of buildings or certain large and bulky pieces of 
equipment are fixed in the short run, but they can vary in the long run following depreciation 
and/or new acquisitions. This aspect of the quasi-fixed inputs should be modeled.  Of course, 
investment is an input (possibly a vector), which must be taken into account in the definition of 
technology. The impact of investment on the production level is known as adjustment costs. The 
temporary (or one-period) production function depends on both investment and variable inputs 
(under the immediate control of the manager) and quasi-fixed inputs (the capital). 
Secondly,  we  define  a  variable  cost  function.    Hence,  we  have  two  representations  of 
technology: the temporary production frontier and the variable cost frontier.  Interesting links 
can be established between the two.  Except for the introduction of investment and adjustment 
costs, our DEA model is simply a modification of the model of Banker and Morey (1986).   
However, this modification is not minor because it includes the analysis of the impact of the 
current  decisions  on  the  firm’s future  prospects.  To  invest  implies  that future  outputs  will 3 
 
increase and future costs and profits will be affected. Unless we were ready to deal with a 
shortsighted DMU, the future impacts ought to be built-in in the current decision-making.  
The choice of intertemporal decision rule is itself an interesting subject of research especially 
in the public sector. Adding an intertemporal adjustment constraint into the firm’s discounted 
cumulative cost minimization problem, we derive the relation between the DEA variables of the 
cost function and those of the temporary production function. 
Finally, we also show how to recover the returns to scale and the implicit prices of both the 
capital and the investment. More importantly, we tackle the question of the measurement of the 
efficiency; both a novelty and a difficult task compared to the static case. 
 
2.  Temporary Production Frontier, Adjustment Cost and Cost of Technical Inefficiencies  
Let F(y, x, k, i) = f(y)-g(x, k, i) = 0 be the production frontier. In order to determine it, the 
following minimization problem must be solved for each DMU
h (h = 1, … , H), 
Min θ 
h                                                               (P) 
 s.t.               f(y
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corresponding investment vector. We assume that adjustment costs are present, so ∂g/∂i< 0 for each 
i≠0. θ






h)  describes a free disposal hull (FDH) production possibility set. 
Problem (P) identifies whether the level of variable inputs can be reduced given the available 
                                                
3 For clarity, we omit the time indexes for the matrices and right-hand side elements of the following linear program. 4 
 
level of quasi-fixed factors and investment within the same production possibility space.  
The production frontier involved in (P) can  be approximated  by the combination of the 
hyperfacets  linking  the  “outer”  DMUs.  For  simplicity,  we  assume  symmetry  between  the 
investment cost and disinvestments cost so that the investment can be measured with its absolute 
value. The linear approximation of (P) can be computed using H linear programs as follows:
 3 
                                h
h
h Min TE θ
,λ θ
=                                                  (TE-primal) 
s.t.         Y 'λ λ λ λ    ≥   y
h                        (α α α αy) 
I'λ λ λ λ  ≥ i 
h                (α α α αi)
 
X'λ λ λ λ   ≤ θ
 hx
h                     (α α α αx) 
K 'λ λ λ λ    ≤   k
h                         (α α α αk) 
1'λ λ λ λ   =   1                 (αc) 
λ λ λ λ  ≥  0,  
where TE
h stands for technical efficiency, the α’s are corresponding associated variables and  
y11     y12   …  y1M                         y
1' 
                                                   y21      y22   …  y2M                        y
2' 
         Y=         …    …   …  …          =     …    
                             yH1      yH2   …  yHM                         y
H' 
is the output matrix of the H DMUs of dimension H×M ; similarly, X is the variable input matrix 
of dimension H×N 
x11     x12   … x1N                        x
1' 
                                                     x21      x22   … x2N                       x
2' 
              X=      …     …   …  …     =       …      ; 
                               xH1      xH2   … xHN                        x
H' 
K is the quasi-fixed inputs matrix of dimension H×L 
k11     k12   …  k1L                          k
1' 
                                                     k21      k22   …  k2L                         k
2' 
              K=      …     …   …  …        =       …   ; 
                                kH1      kH2   …  kHL                        k
H' 
Iis the H×L matrix of the absolute value of investment-disinvestment 
i11    i12  …i1L            i
1' 
                                                     i21    i22  …i2L                     i
2' 
          I=       …        …    …  …         =       …       ; 
                                iH1    iH2 …iHL                     i
H' 
and 1 is a vector of ones with appropriate dimension.  If not mentioned, the dimension of vector 5 
 
1 is equal to the number of DMU. The α α α α's are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
corresponding constraints. All the DMUs on the final frontiers will be characterized by their 
optimal value of θ =1.  The first four groups of restrictions in TE-primal constitute the DEA form 
of the FDH production possibility set.  The fifth one is a convexity restriction.  
The Lagrange function of the problem TE-primal can be written as 
           LTE  = θ 
h+α α α αy' (y
h-Y 'λ λ λ λ)+α α α αi' (i 
h-I'λ λ λ λ)-α α α αx' (θ
hx
h -X 'λ λ λ λ)-α α α αk' (k
h -K 'λ λ λ λ)+αc(1' λ λ λ λ -1) 
      = (α α α αy'y
h+α α α αi'i 
h-α α α αk'k
h -αc)+θ 
h(1-α α α αx'x
h)-[α α α αy'Y '+α α α αi'I'-α α α αx'X '-α α α αk'K '-αc1']λ λ λ λ . 
At this stage,  it  is worthwhile to highlight  our assumption about the symmetry between 
investment and disinvestment costs. Without this hypothesis, the constraint in (P) takes its 
original form of two inequalities, I+'λ λ λ λ ≥ i
h












+ is the absolute value of the disinvestment vector of the DMU
h, R
L
+ is the subset of the 
vectors with non-negative components in the L-dimension Euclidian space, and I+ and I- are the 











- and I=I++I-.  Without the symmetry assumption, the Lagrange function of (P) is 
LTE =θ
h +α α α αy' (y








 -I- 'λ λ λ λ)-α α α αx' (θ
hx
h -X 'λ λ λ λ)-α α α αk' (k
h-K 'λ λ λ λ)+αc(1'λ λ λ λ-1). 









0.  This corresponds to the equality α α α αi
+
 = α α α αi
- whenever we use TE-primal as the linear 
approximate of (P). Let α α α αi = α α α αi
+




h +α α α αy' (y





--I+ 'λ λ λ λ
 -I- 'λ λ λ λ)-α α α αx' (θ
hx
h -X 'λ λ λ λ)-α α α αk' (k
h-K 'λ λ λ λ)+αc(1'λ λ λ λ-1) 
                =θ
h +α α α αy' (y
h -Y 'λ λ λ λ)+α α α αi' (i 
h-I 'λ λ λ λ)-α α α αx' (θ
hx
h -X 'λ λ λ λ)-α α α αk' (k
h-K 'λ λ λ λ)+αc(1'λ λ λ λ-1) 
                =LTE . 
The assumption of symmetry between the investment and disinvestment costs simplifies the 
writings of our linear approximation model, but it is not essential. One may re-decompose i
h and 6 
 
I into investments and disinvestments whenever needed. 
The dual problem of (TE-primal) is  
Maxα α α α (α α α αy'y
h + α α α αi'i
h-α α α αk'k
h - αc)           (TE-dual) 
                                 s.t.           α α α αx'x
h = 1                                                   (θ
 h) 
Yα α α αy +Iα α α αi – Xα α α αx– Kα α α αk  – αc1 ≤ 0                (λ λ λ λ) 
α α α αy,  α α α αi,  α α α αx, α α α αk   ≥ 0 
αc free. 
In standard notations, the technology should be written as F(y, x, k, i) = 0, especially in the 
absence  of  symmetry  of  adjustment  costs.  However,  for  the  linear  approximation  of  the 
technology to be comparable with our DEA model with symmetric adjustment costs, we use    
F(y, x, k,i) = 0 rather than F(y, x, k, i) = 0.  




0), the first-order Taylor expansion is 



























where the partial derivatives Fy, Fx, Fk, and Fi are row vectors; (y, x, k,i) is an arbitrary point 
in an appropriate neighborhood of O. Of course, the smoothness of F(y, x, k,i) is required 
throughout the paper, as it is usually assumed in the literature. 

























Note that LTE  ≈ L
h, i.e. 
θ 
h + αc(1'λ λ λ λ -1)+α α α αy' (y
h -Y 'λ λ λ λ)-α α α αx' (θ
hx
h -X'λ λ λ λ)-α α α αk' (k
h - K 'λ λ λ λ)+α α α αi' (i
h-I 'λ λ λ λ) 














0).         (1) 
To ensure a good approximation in (1), we need to carefully choose a frontier point O for the 
given DMU





h) with 0< ψ
h ≤ θ
h, for any given 
DMU
h.  Let us highlight this point with the help of Figure 1.      7 
 
 
   
The tangency hyperplan at O and the small facet are approximately parallel.  The gradients of 
the facet at the fictive point DMU
λ and that of the theoretical frontier surface at O should be 
considered equal.  If DMU
λ is an extreme point, the α α α α’s are not unique.  However, various values 
of α α α α’s do not greatly differ when the number of the observed DMU’s are sufficiently great, 
because we have assumed the smoothness of F.  Furthermore, under the assumption of second 
order differentiability of the function F, one can evaluate the partial derivatives of F at O by 
those correspondingly at DMU
λ.  The error incurred by this approximation is at most (θ -ψ)║x║, 
where ║•║ is the Euclidian norm. Hence, (1) yields:  
α α α αy =µF
0
y', α α α αi  =µF
0
i', α α α αx = -µF
0
(θ x)',   α α α αk = -µF
0
k' ,   
if we identify “=” with “≈”.  On the other hand, the first-order conditions of (P) give ∂L
h/∂θ
h = 0, 
i.e., 1 + µF(θ x)x
h
 = 0 or µ = -1/(F(θ x)x
h).  Therefore, the links between the technology and the 
dual variables of technical efficiency problem are  
α α α αy = -Fy' /(F(θ x)x
h),α α α αi = -Fi' /(F(θ x)x
h), α α α αx = F(θ x) '/(F(θ x)x
h), α α α αk =  Fk '/(F(θ x)x
h) . 
Further, from F(θx)' = α α α αx(F(θ x)x
h), it follows that Fx1N =(1N'α α α αx)(Fxx
h), which is valid at any 
frontier point
4. We can now rewrite these relations between the partial derivatives and the α α α α’s.  
                                                
4 1N is a N-vector of ones; N  being the number of variable inputs. 8 
 
Fy /(Fx1N)   = - α α α αy'/(1N'α α α αx),  
Fi/(Fx1N) = - α α α αi'/(1N'α α α αx),  
Fx /(Fx1N)   =   α α α αx'/(1N'α α α αx),                                              (2) 
Fk/(Fx1N)   =    α α α αk'/(1N'α α α αx).  
The measure of technical efficiency can be expressed in terms of variable input levels. The 









obs is the 
observed variable cost of DMU h and w
h
n is the market price of the nth variable input.  The 






obs.   
 
3.    The  Variable  Cost  Function  in  the  Presence  of  Adjustment  Cost  and  the  Cost  of 
Allocative Inefficiencies 
The cost of technical inefficiency results from a choice of inputs that is below the production 
frontier.  Other  costs  might  result  because  all  choices  on  the  production  frontier  are  not 
equivalent.  Given the price vector w
h of variable input factors x
h, some points on the frontier will 
yield a minimal production variable cost.  To determine these points, the following variable cost 
minimization problem must be solved: 
C
h






h)}                                  (C) 








 h)                                                (AE-primal) 
=Min µ , E x w
h'xE 
s.t. 
                  Y 'µ µ µ µ  ≥ y
h                                   (β β β βy) 
                                            I 'µ µ µ µ  ≥i 
h
                                                     (β β β βi) 
                                                X 'µ µ µ µ ≤ x
h                                        (β β β βx) 
                                                           K 'µ µ µ µ  ≤ k
h                                     (β β β βk) 
                                               xE -X'µ µ µ µ = 0                                          (β β β βE) 
                     1'µ µ µ µ  = 1                                       (βc) 
                                                         µ µ µ µ ≥ 0 9 
 
where  xE is  the  solution  to the variable cost minimization problem. The cost of allocation 
inefficiencies is the difference between the efficient cost calculated in the previous section and 





min).  In the traditional way, the allocative inefficiency 
(AE









Added  together,  the  allocation  and  technical  inefficiencies  yield  the  total  cost  surplus.  
Similarly, the product of the allocation and technical inefficiencies yields the global inefficiency 









The Lagrange function of (AE-primal) is  
LAE = w
h'xE+β β β βy' (y
h-Y'µ µ µ µ)+β β β βi' (i
h-I'µ µ µ µ)-β β β βx' (x
h-X'µ µ µ µ)-β β β βk' (k
h-K’µ µ µ µ) -β β β βE' (xE -X'µ µ µ µ)+βc(1'µ µ µ µ -1) 
       = [β β β βy'y
h + β β β βi'i
h-β β β βx'x
h-β β β βk'k
h -βc] -[β β β βy'Y'+β β β βi'I'-(β β β βx'+β β β βE' )X'-β β β βk'K'- βc1']µ µ µ µ + (w
h'-β β β βE')xE. 
The dual problem of (AE-primal) is written as 
Maxβ β β β[β β β βy'y
h +β β β βi'i 
h-β β β βx'x
h-β β β βk'k
h -βc]                             (AE-dual) 
                                      s.t.                w
h = β β β βE                                             (xE) 
Yβ β β βy +Iβ β β βi -X(β β β βx+β β β βE) -Kβ β β βk - βc1 ≤ 0                    (µ µ µ µ) 
               β β β βy, β β β βi, β β β βx , β β β βk  ≥ 0 
                                       βc free. 
The Envelope Theorem shows that at the optimum, 
            ∂C
h
AE/∂w
h      = ∂LAE/∂w




h       = ∂LAE/∂y









h       = ∂LAE/∂k
h       = - β β β βk '                 
At the optimal level of the problem (C), C
h
min = w
h'x + φ F(y, x, k,i), where φ is a Lagrange 
multiplier.  By Envelope Theorem, ∂C
h
min/∂w
h= x'.   From first-order conditions, w
h' = -φ∂F/∂x. 
If the sum of the variable input prices is normalized to 1,
4 then 1= w
h'1N  = -φFx1N, thus φ = 
-1/Fx1N.  Again by using Envelope Theorem on optimized C
h
min, we have that 
                                                
4   Naturally, it would be possible to impose other types of normalization.  For example, we could impose that the nth price be 
equal to 1.  This implies an asymmetry in the treatment of inputs.  For that reason, we preferred the above normalization.  




min/∂y    = φ∂F/∂y     = -Fy/ Fx1N;   
∂C
h
min/∂i= φ∂F/∂i= -Fi/Fx1N;                                                             (4) 
                                                              ∂C
h
min/∂k     = φ∂F/∂k    = -Fk/ Fx1N. 




min. We can have, from (6) and (7), that  
Fy / Fx1N   = -  β β β βy' 
Fi / Fx1N = - β β β βi'
                                                                                 (5) 
Fx / Fx1N   =    w
h' 
Fk / Fx1N   =    β β β βk'                                       
This is an alternative way to express the first-order derivatives of the production function. 
From (2) and (5), an interesting relationship between the dual variables of technical efficiency 
problem and allocation efficiency problem can be drawn under the normalization, 
                          β β β βy = α α α αy /1N'α α α αx ,  β β β βi  = α α α αi/1N'α α α αx ,  β β β βE = w
h= α α α αx /1N'α α α αx ,  β β β βk = α α α αk /1'α α α αx .         (6) 
 
4. Intertemporal Decisions   
The investment decisions are the result of an optimization over several periods. For any specific 
firm (for simplicity, index h is omitted in this section),  





τ[Cτ(wτ, kτ, i τ, qτ)+ qτ'iτ] } 
s.t.       kτ+1 = (E-∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)kτ + iτ,   τ = t, t +1, … , T                                      (7) 
where ρ is the discount factor, E is the (L×L)-identity matrix, ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ is the (L×L)- rate-of-depreciation 
matrix (diagonal) which is supposed constant and defined by ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ll = δl and ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆lv = 0, for v ≠ l, and qτ 
is the investment-price vector.  Serving as the control instrument, investment iτ may be optimally 
decided to be positive or negative or null. Unlike the previous sections of this chapter, it is better 
to let the investments take their algebraic values in the above intertemporal decision model, 
instead of absolute values. 
The Hamilton function of (7) can be written as  
H=ρ
τ[Cτ(wτ, kτ, iτ, qτ)+qτ’iτ] - ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕτ+1' (iτ - ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆kτ), 11 
 
where the Hamilton multiplier vector (of dimension L), ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕτ+1, is already actualized. At optimum, 
the following necessary conditions will be verified.  
ρ
τ[∂Cτ/∂i τ'+qτ] = ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕτ+1,          for τ = t, t +1 , …  , T                 (8) 
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕτ+2 -ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕτ+1 =ρ
τ+1∂Cτ+1/∂kτ+1'+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕτ+2,  for τ = t, t +1,  … , T-1.              (9)  
                                    kτ+1- kτ = iτ
+-∆ ∆ ∆ ∆kτ ,                        for τ = t, t +1, …  , T.             
The terminal conditions are ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕT+1 = 0(L×1).     
Consider now the case of τ = t. From (9),   
(E-∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕt+2 - ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕt+1 = ρ
t+1∂Ct+1/∂kt+1',  
or, with the delay-operator defined by Lzt = zt-1,  
[(E-∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)L
-1 - E]ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕt+1 = ρ
t+1∂Ct+1/∂kt+1' . 
Under common assumption, the norm of (E-∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)L
-1<1. This allows us to have the following 
expansion according to the basic spectrum theorem of linear operators,  
                                    ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕt+1  = - ∑
∞
=0 s
(E-∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)
sL
-s(ρ
t+1∂Ct+1/∂kt+1').                                                          (10) 
(8) and (10) lead to 




(E-∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)
s (ρ




t. We get  
    ∂Ct/∂it '= -1/(1 + r){∑
∞
=0 s
[(E-∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)/(1 + r)]
s (∂Ct+s+1/∂kt+s+1')} – qt  .                    (11) 
(11) plays the key role in the links of decisions from period to period. It shows how the 
investment prices, the capital shadow prices and the adjustment shadow prices are organically 
related.  Unfortunately it seems that, in general, even if the future shadow prices were available, 
the sum in (11) might be too difficult to be calculated without any further assumption. We then 
make the following simplification assumption. 
 
Assumption 1: ∂Ct+s+1/∂kt+s+1 ≡ ∂Ct/∂kt  = -bkt', for all s. 12 
 
Under this assumption, (11) can be rewritten as  
∂Ct/∂it'  = 1/(1 + r){∑
∞
=0 s
[(E - ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)/(1 + r)]
sbkt} – qt 
= 1/(1+r){E-[(E-∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)/(1 +r)]}
-1bkt – qt        
              = (rE + ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)
-1bkt – qt    
For the lth component of ∂Ct/∂it, we get  
∂Cτ/∂ilτ' = bkl,t/(r + δl) – qlt.                                                                                     (12) 
This is just what we have sought: the intertemporal adjustment restriction describing the 
relationship between the capital’s shadow prices and its marginal adjustment costs. 
Until now, ilτ takes its algebraic value in the intertemporal decision model. To incorporate this 
dynamic relationship into DEA models where we use the absolute value of the investments, we 
must find the partial derivates of the variable cost function w. r. t. it .   ∂Ct/∂ilt has the same sign 
with ilt for every l =1, 2, ..., L. Actually according to (12), the firm invests in lth quasi-fixed input 
(ilt >0) when bkl,t/(r +δl)-qlt >0; it disinvests in lth quasi-fixed input (ilt <0) when bkl,t/(r +δl)-qlt <0 
and it does not change lth quasi-fixed input (ilt =0) when bkl,t/(r +δl) - qlt =0.  
Then it is always true that for each l = 1, 2, …, L, 
∂Ct/∂ilt' =bkl,t/(r +δl)-qlt,  
that is, 
                                                                bk1, t /(r +δ1)-q1t 
bk2, t /(r +δ2)-q2t 
∂Ct/∂it'=       ...........................    .                                            (13) 
bkL, t /(r +δL)-qLt 
 
5.  Dynamic DEA Model 
Now it is possible to incorporate the intertemporal adjustment restrictions we have obtained in 
(13)  on  our  DEA  models  (TE-primal  or  dual)  and  (AE-primal  or  dual).  Without  these 
intertemporal restrictions, the decision maker can independently make the production plan for 13 
 
each  period.  The  only  factor  that influences  the  current  investment  quantity  is  the  current 
purchase price of the quasi-fixed inputs. But with the restrictions (16), he should take the impacts 
of future capitals’ shadow prices into account, which affect the choice of current investment via 
the marginal adjustment costs. 
5.1.  Technical Efficiency 
Under Assumption 1: ∂Ct+s+1/∂kt+s+1' ≡ -bkt = β β β βkt. In terms of DEA variables,   
β β β βk(t+s) ≡ β β β βkt,            for all s ≥ 0.                               (14) 
Another “indirect” impact of this assumption comes from (13) and (14) and can be written as 
follows.  For each l, l =1, 2, …, L, and s, s =0,1, 2, … 
       βil
 
t+s =∂Ct+s/∂ilt+s'=(r+δl)
-1bklt –qlt .                                       (15) 
Assumption 1 also has impacts on α α α α’s. This may be seen from (6) and (15).  In fact, we can easily 
show, using the normalization 1N'w
h = 1, that  
                                    α α α αk(t+s)/1N'α α α αx(t+s) = β β β βk(t+s) = β β β βkt = α α α αkt/1N'α α α αxt   
   α α α αk(t+s) = (1N'α α α αx(t+s)/ 1N'α α α αxt) α α α αkt,      for all s ≥ 0.                              (16) 
And for each l, l=1, 2, …, L, 
                            αilt/1N'α α α αxt =βilt =(r+δl)
-1bklt –qlt 
         αilt =1N'α α α α xt(r+δl)
-1bklt -1N'α α α α xtqlt=(r+δl)
-1α klt -1N'α α α α xtqlt.                (17) 
It is convenient to write (17) in vector form in order to rewrite our DEA models. We take off 
the absolute by using the sign function. 
                              αilt=[(r+δl)
-1α klt -1N'α α α α xtqlt] · sign[(r+δl)
-1α klt -1N'α α α α xtqlt]. 
Thus, 
                                                  α α α αit=Zt[(rE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)
-1α α α α kt -1N'α α α α xtqt],                                           (18)  
where 
sign(i1t) 
Zt =                                                                            . 
                                                                                                             
                                                                                            sign(iLt) 
since sign((r+δl)
-1α klt -1N'α α α α xtqlt) = sign(ilt) for every l =1, 2, ..., L. We have it = Ztit. From (17) 14 
 
and (18), the lth component of α α α αi (t+s) is written as  
αil (t+s) =(r+δl)
-1(1N'α α α αx (t+s)/ 1N'α α α αxt)αklt -1N'α α α αx q(t+s),    for all s ≥ 0. 
The TE-dual problem in section I can be written in matrix form as  
                                                                             y
h 
                            TE
h=Max[αy'  αi'  αx'  αk']     i
h                                             (TE-dual) 
                                
α 
                                                 0 
                                                                        -k
h    
    s.t. 
                                                                      αy                               
      0'    0'     x
h'   0'              αi                  1                             (θ
h) 
                                  Y   I   -X   -K               αx           ≤              .                        (λ
h) 
             αk                       0 
Substituting the above restriction in this problem we get, for the period t and for each DMU
h, 










t                                         (TE-dualrestricted) 







 s.t.                                                                                                      
                0'                 x
h
t'                                    0'                            α α α αyt                1     (θ
h
t) 
                                                                                                             α α α αxt        ≤            . 




t1N'+Xt)        [ItZ
h
t (rtE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)




We can now rewrite the primal problem as follows: 




h = Min  [1    0']                                                                        (TE-primalrestricted) 





                 λ
h
t     
s.t. 
                           0                        Yt'                                                        y
h
t     
                           x
h




t1N'+Xt) '           θ
h








             [ItZ
h
t(rtE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)
-1-Kt] '            λ
h







t]     
                            0                         1'                                                            1 
 
5.2.  Allocative Efficiency 
Similar  to  what  we  have  done  with  TE  model,  we  can  now  incorporate  the  intertemporal 
constraints into the AE problem. The direct way to do this is also to start with rewriting of 
AE-dual problem, as it is the dual variables that carry the explicit intertemporal information. 
Note that from (6) and (18), β β β βit =Z
h
t [(rtE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)
-1β β β βkt  - q
h
t].  Put this relation into the AE-dual model:  15 
 
                                                           yt
h 
               -xt
h
                                 










h.     (AE-dualrestricted) 
                      
β                                               0 
                                                                             1 
s.t.                                                                            βyt 
                                                                                             βxt                  w
h
t                       (xE
h
t) 
     0'       0'                      0'                      E       0'           βkt       ≤                       . 
             Yt      -Xt      [ItZ
h
t(rtE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)




t                 (λ
h
t) 
                                                                                                β0t                  
Hence the primal problem becomes 
                                                                               xEt 
CAE = min [w
h









h.         (AE-primalrestricted) 
                                
 xE, λ                                         λ λ λ λt 
s.t.                 0                     Yt'                                                                y
h
t 
0                    -Xt'                            xE
h
t                                          -x
h
t 
    0       [ItZ
h
t (rtE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)







t]    . 
                                E                    -Xt'                           λ λ λ λ
h
t                                0            
                                0                      1'                                                                 1 
                                0                      E                                                                  0 
 
6.  Results 
6.1. Final Version of the Dynamic DEA Model 
For the sake of clarity, we add from now on the DMU’s full index h and t for all the DEA 
variables, as well as for matrix Z and vector q. Now let us present the final form of the technical 
and allocative models  in both primal and dual settings. In these models,  the  intertemporal 
constraints are introduced.  
The technical efficiency primal problem is 
                                                         h
t ,
h Min TE θ λ θ =  
 
s.t.                                 Yt'λ
h
t ≥   y
h
t                                          (α α α α
h
yt) 
















t                    (α α α α
h
xt)               (19) 
      
                                Gt' λ
h
t ≥   g
h
t                      (α α α α
h
kt)              (20) 
                                                 1'λ
h
t  ≥ 1 
             λ
h




















t(rtE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)
-1-Kt] and g
h








The TE-dual model is 
      TE
















t}                                
s.t.                                         x
h
t'α α α α
h
xt = 1                                  (θ
h
t)     










tα α α α
h
kt ≤  0.                           (λ
h
t)  














tIt'λ λ λ λt] .           (AE-primalrestricted) 
                                                             
xE,λ                      
s.t.                               Yt' λt    ≥   y
h
t 
                -Xt' λt   ≥  -x
h
t 
                        G
h
t' λt  ≥   g
h
t  
Xt' λt   =   xE
h
t 
                                                       1' λt   ≥   1         
                                                           λt   ≥   0  
It  is  remarkable  that  the  objective  function  has  been  modified.  The  problem  is  now  to 
minimize the total cost for each period, including the investment expenditures.  
Its dual model is 
C
h








h + β β β β 
h
kt'gt
h  + β 
h
0t }               
s.t.          Yt β
h
yt - Xt β
h










t               (λ
h
t) 
All the investments take their absolute values. 
 
6.2. Some Further Expositions for the Dynamic Models 
Now both of the technical efficiency and the allocative efficiency models take account of cross 
period constraints. How do these constraints make a firm’s intertemporal behaviors different 
















t).                            (21) 
The right-hand side of the inequality (21) should be positive for each of its elements according to 
the original constraints of the problem (TE-primal). The investment implies an adjustment cost 
that can be defined in terms of quantities of variable factors becoming non productive.  For an 








t = 0.  For an 
efficient firm that does invest, the quantities of variable inputs should be greater than those that 



















t) corresponds to the adjustment cost. 
Whenever a firm’s performance is not efficient, the term x
h





explains why (19) plays the role of variable inputs’ constraints in the dynamic DEA model for 
technical efficiency.  
Another remarkable difference between our dynamic models and static ones is (20). The 
original form of this constraint is [ItZ
h
t (rtE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)
-1-Kt]'λ
h





h]. To simplify 
our interpretations, let’s also consider the case of positive investments and thus Z=E. Take out a 
single inequality from it in order to highlight its economic sense, for example, the constraint for 
the lth quasi-fixed input,  
{[It(rtE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)





lt],                                      (22) 






lt] ≥{[ Kt-It(rtE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)
-1]' λ
h
t }ll .  




































The passageway from (23) to (24) is due to the capital movement law. Then, we may put (22) 

















lt(1-δl){[ Kt-It(rtE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)
-1]'λ
h
t }ll.             (25) 
At the beginning of the initial time τ=0 which corresponding to t, the DMU invests i
h
lt. The 
discounted residual value of i
h
lt for the future is equal to the sum of the series. The difference at 
the left hand side of (25) represents the productive part of the lth capital stock during the period t, 
and  therefore  a  cost  of  the  current  production.  Being  one  of  the  constraints  of  the 
cost-minimization problem, (25) means that for DMU
h, the productive part of the capital stock is, 
at least, as great as that of the best DMUs, in other words, the DMU
h’s production plan is 
feasible.  
Finally, the objective of the allocative efficiency problem is also augmented in the presence of 
quasi-fixed  factors.  Now  it  is  to  seek  the  minimum  of  total  cost  while  the  intertemporal 
adjustment expenditures are considered.  
The unique difference between the first two static models and the dynamic ones we have 
studied in this chapter is that, in the dynamic model, the multipliers β β β β and α α α α are tied by the 
intertemporal restrictions. 
 
7. A Comparison with Nemoto and Goto (1999 and 2003) Model 
Recall the dynamic DEA model that Nemoto and Goto (1999 and 2003) proposed. Our model 
bears some resemblances to theirs, but we argue that our model is more general.   19 
 
First, instead of working on the variable of investment it, Nemoto and Goto (2003) imposes 
that, among others that are the same as ours, for each quasi-fixed input, (for simplicity, we 
assume in this section that there is only one quasi-fixed input): 
Kt'λ λ λ λt ≤ kt                                                                  (26) 
Kt+1'λ λ λ λt ≥ kt+1,                                                            (27) 
where Kt is the column vector of the considered quasi-fixed input of the different DMU’s and kt is 
the considered quasi-fixed input of the considered DMU. 
Let δ be the depreciation rate for this quasi-fixed factor. It follows from (26) and (27) that  
Kt+1'λ λ λ λt-(1-δ)Kt'λ λ λ λt ≥ kt+1-(1-δ)kt. 
This means that restrictions (26) and (27) imposed in Nemoto and Goto (2003) imply our 
constraints when the investments are non-negative, that is, 
Kt'λ λ λ λt ≤  kt                                                                (28) 
It'λ λ λ λt  ≥  it.                                                                (29) 
where It is the column vector of the investment in the considered quasi-fixed input of the 
different DMU’s and it is the investment in the quasi-fixed input of the considered DMU. 
Note that (28) and (29) do not imply (27). In fact, (28) implies that there exists a non negative 
γt such that (1-δ)Kt' λ λ λ λt+γt = (1-δ)kt. This equation and (29) yield 
Kt+1' λ λ λ λt+γt = [(1-δ)Kt + It]'λ λ λ λt +γt  ≥ (1-δ)kt+it = kt+1, 
but not Kt+1'λt≥ kt+1. In other words, our restrictions on the capital movement, (28) and (29), are 
weaker than those of Nemoto-Goto’s and thus the feasible set of Nemoto-Goto’s model is a 
subset of ours. Consequently, the cost function determined in the present paper is smaller than 
that determined in the way shown in Nemoto and Goto (2003). In general, the production 
technology determined in this paper is more productive than that drawn from Nemoto and Goto 
(2003) and hence closer to the theoretical one when the investment is non-negative. Thus, one 
can conclude that the model of Nemoto and Goto (2003) leads to an overestimated efficiency 20 
 
score in case of non-negative investment. 
When investment it=[kt+1-(1-δ)kt] is negative for each DMU, the reasonable constraints on the 
investment should be -It'λ λ λ λt ≥ -it since the adjustment cost increases with the disinvestment 
quantity and the fictive DMU suffers from an adjustment cost at least as that of the considered 
DMU. This inequality is just our restriction. It implies, together with (26), Kt+1'λ λ λ λt ≤ kt+1, and not 
(27) (Nemoto-Goto restriction). Consequently, the feasible set of the model of Nemoto and Goto 
(2003) is incorrect and so for the efficiency score.  
A second contribution is worth noting.  The model of Nemoto and Goto (2003) includes, for 
each DMU, one constraint for each input and each output, and that for every period.  For example, 
in case of one variable input/one quasi-fixed input/one output, if there are T periods, the model 
includes 4*T constraints, that is T constraints for the variable input, 2*T constraints for the 
quasi-fixed inputs, and T constraints for the output  (plus one additional constraint if variable 
returns to scale are imposed).  Obviously, this may represent a numerical burden. Furthermore, 
there is no reason a priori to suppose that the time horizon for the firm is equal to the number of 
period of observations.  Also, the interpretation of the results becomes quite troublesome.  This 
model, if we are ready to accept it as such, is meaningful only for the first period.  Period 2 to T 
restrictions are only expected (even if we assume perfect foresight).  This model has a meaning 
only if we are ready to assume that what has been planned in period 1 for periods 2 to T is 
realized as such in reality.  In other words, the acquisition of information after period 1 will not 
change the decision for periods 2 to T taken in period 1.   Every decision is taken in period 1.  
Certainly, this is a very restrictive behavioral assumption.  In our model, the decisions for period 
t are taken in period t, and new information is explicitly introduced.  21 
 
8.  Generalization of Efficiency Measurements 
Recall the traditional measures of efficiencies TE, AE and OE previously defined. The measure 
of technical efficiency of DMU
h in a given year is actually the ratio of the cost of a technically 






The measure of allocative efficiency of DMU










And, the measure of global efficiency is defined as the product  
OE
h
 t = TE
h
 t  × AE
h




 obs-t  . 
The performance of a given DMU is efficient if and only if OE = 1.  
We have seen that the dynamic and the static allocative models were different: the investment 
expenditures are taken into the objective function and thus the problem is actually to minimize 
the total costs of current production, not only the variable costs. This is one of the significant 
impacts of the intertemporal restrictions. In fact, it is impossible to consider the variable cost 
independently on and separately from the investment costs. To capture the nature of dynamic 
context, we should appropriately redefine those efficiency measures.  
At this point, the objective function of the dynamic allocative efficiency model AE-primal is 
heuristic. From it, we define now (for DMU h at time t): 
AEd 
h
t   = 
cost   total   efficient y  Technicall










tIt'λ λ λ λ
 h
t 











The relevant technical efficiency measure is defined by  
                                    TEd 
h
t  =  
cost   total   Observed






















The product TEd 
h
t × AEd 
h
t defines the global efficiency measure:  
OEd 
h
t  =  TEd 
h
t × AEd 
h
t  
           = 
cost   total   Observed










tIt'λ λ λ λ
 h
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h is the observed total cost. 
The  three  new  efficiency  measures  degenerate  to  static  ones  if  no  investment  occurs. 
Moreover, it is not difficult to see, from the definitions, the following interesting relations 
between the static measures and dynamic measures.  
TEd 
h
t -1 = (TE
h








                          = (TE
h
t -1) × (Share of the observed variable cost in the observed total cost), 
AEd 
h
t -1 = (AE
h



























                          = [(AE
h
t -1) × (Share of the technically efficient variable cost in the technically 
efficient total cost)] + (Share of inefficient investment cost in the 

























              = [(OE
h
t -1) × (Share of the observed variable cost in the observed total cost)] 
+ (Share of inefficient investment cost in the observed total cost). 
It must be noted that if massive disinvestments occur, the great value of sold or consumed 
equipment, that enters the cost function in negative values, becomes a part of the DMU’s revenue 





t and OEd 
h
t may be greater than one. Moreover, it is possible that these new 
efficiency measures take negative values. This phenomenon is impossible in static settings. The 
negative scores and those greater than one contradict somewhat the usual concept: an efficiency 
score should preferably be between zero and one. Anyway, it is mathematically easy to define an 
efficiency score in order to conform better to the usual custom. Before to do this, we must answer 
the following questions.  23 
 
With dynamic settings, what is the criterion for a given DMU to be efficient, that is, to be on 
the frontier? Is it still the case that a DMU is efficient if and only if OEd =1? 
An efficient DMU must have a score equal to one, neither less nor greater than one. This is 
because  any  score  OEd  different  from  one  means  some  kind  of  deviation  from  optimal 
performance. As the efficiency score may deviate one from the left as well as from the right, our 
assumption about the symmetry between investment cost and disinvestment cost implies that the 
scores 1-ε and 1+ε means the same inefficiency level, for any ε > 0. Based on this observation, 
we introduce the following index of global efficiency: 
                                                                              1 
GE 
h




Obviously, the global efficiency score GE is always a positive number between zero and one; a 
greater GE corresponds a more effective DMU; and a DMU is efficient if and only if its GE is 
equal to one. The relation between GE and OEd is illustrated in the following figure. 
If  there  is  neither  investment  nor  disinvestment,  OEd  does  not  differ  from  OE.  This 
corresponds to the part of the curve GE above the interval [0, 1]. The particular case of OE = 0 
corresponds to GE =1/2, instead of zero. GE offers only an alternative choice of the efficiency 
measurement to conform the custom if this is necessary. 
                                             GE 
                                                 1 
                  
                                                
                                              1/2 
 
 
                                                    0                  1                                                           OEd  
 
Figure 2 Relationship between GE and OEd 
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9. Technology Measurements 
9.1. Implicit Prices 











t', where β β β β
h
kt is evaluated at the optimal level and can be obtained from the solution of 
the dual problem of allocative efficiency. 
As for the implicit prices of investments, one needs to get β β β β
h
kt, at first. Then, the implicit prices 
can be calculated by using the relation 
β β β β
h
it =(rtE+∆ ∆ ∆ ∆)
















t, l = 1, 2, ..., L. 
 
9.2 Returns to Scale 
The solution of the dual problem of technical efficiency gives us α α α α
h
yt and α α α α
h
xt, which are the 
transposed vectors of the partial derivatives of the production frontier Fx and Fy.  Of course, one 
can easily compute returns to scale, shadow prices and potential economies all by using the 
values of the dual variable of the technical efficiency model. Anyway, one can also choose 
another alternative method  if needed. In fact,  by using the relations between  α α α α 's and β β β β 's 
obtained in (9), we can obtain the elasticity of returns to scale with β β β β 's. Indeed, (6) reflects the 
duality between the production function and cost function.  Substituting the relations (6), we can 
recover the returns to scale by using any of the following: 
RTS
h = - [Fx(xE
h
t) + Fk k
h





         = -{[α α α α
h




t+[α α α α
h




t -[α α α α
h




t}÷{-[α α α α
h





         =  [β β β βE' xE
h
t +β β β βk' k
h
t -β β β βi' i
h







 +β β β βk' k
h
t -β β β βi' i
h
t] ÷[β β β βy'y
h




We have introduced a dynamic version of DEA. The augmented model allows us to measure 
technical and allocative efficiencies as in the standard model while the inter-temporal restrictions 
are considered. It has been shown that the necessary data set is made up of contemporary prices 
and quantities of inputs (including investment) and outputs so that the calculation is fairly easy to 
perform.  Of course, the linear program has exactly the same form than the standard model, so 
that  no  particular  programming  is  required.  Under  dynamic  circumstance,  we  define  new 
measures of efficiency that take account of investment expenditures. Finally, we develop explicit 
formula of implicit prices of quasi-fixed inputs and investments, and returns to scale. 
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